@wbnr/designnpm
@wbnr/design is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11196) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 99.0.0, 99.0.1, 99.1.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wbnr/design (npm)
What this malware does
The package's preinstall lifecycle script runs automatically on npm install. It reads the installer's username (from USER/USERNAME environment variables) and the machine hostname (via os.hostname()), then embeds those identifiers along with the package name and a timestamp into both a DNS lookup and an HTTPS GET request directed at a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain, 4otph6fase1x2won0hrfzul2wt2qqge5.oastify.com. The package name and scope (@wbnr) and its self-description indicate a dependency-confusion payload targeting an internal organization scope; any environment that resolves @wbnr/design from public npm will leak installer host identifiers to the attacker-controlled out-of-band endpoint. The 'harmless bug bounty PoC' framing in the package description does not change the observable behavior: installer-owned identifiers leave the machine to a third-party OOB collector on install.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@wbnr/design' @ 99.3.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wbnr/design (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wbnr/design across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wbnr/design is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wbnr/design was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wbnr/design before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wbnr/design-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.