Which versions of @walknpm/todo-cli are malicious?

The following npm versions of @walknpm/todo-cli are flagged malicious: 2.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @walknpm/todo-cli if I installed it?

@walknpm/todo-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @walknpm/todo-cli — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @walknpm/todo-cli was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is @walknpm/todo-cli part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @walknpm/todo-cli is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-021758 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @walknpm/todo-cli across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @walknpm/todo-cli (version 2.0.1).

Malicious package

@walknpm/todo-clinpm

Advisory published Oct 26, 2026Updated Oct 26, 2026

@walknpm/todo-cli is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18320) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 2.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @walknpm/todo-cli (npm)

MAL-2026-18320

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @walknpm/todo-cli

What this malware does

@walknpm/[email protected] is a new release of a todo-list CLI and web app whose only change from 2.0.0 is a postinstall script, sh scripts/miner.sh, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (sh /tmp/.smi agent), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in [email protected] within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129).

The package's postinstall hook runs scripts/miner.sh, which fetches a gzip-compressed payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> in a presigned URL), writes it to /tmp/.smi, and executes it via sh on every npm install. If root or passwordless sudo is available, the script runs sh /tmp/.smi agent to install a persistent agent (cron/relay/tor per in-script comments). Otherwise, it extracts an embedded XMRig binary (base64/tar.gz blob after a __PAYLOAD__ marker), writes a Monero pool configuration to $HOME/.sysmond.json pointing at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with wallet 49u1mKb1dNoMixgRHt11Ra32D1w4hviUuRDbaJhXFwXUjQP4FiHsSjnDa7XZepDUW1Tx6HhR6gFwWgbuwNxby4UAMiqxieX, copies the miner to $HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/<stealth-name> using a system-daemon-like name pool (edid-mon, smmon, irqstatsd,...), and backgrounds it with nohup. Installing the package results in unconditional remote code execution on the installer's host, cryptomining compute/electricity theft, and persistence that is non-trivial to detect and remove.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@walknpm/todo-cli' @ 2.0.1 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8c741f8bd0012bceb8789b8e2fc0ac836c5ccb88a348918365af4850f1576be4

f32e42bc70458d6a0973dfbe2d94961cca2ee423198c53bf753a7680c61df96f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @walknpm/todo-cli (version 2.0.1).
If you installed it — respond
@walknpm/todo-cli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @walknpm/todo-cli was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. @walknpm/todo-cli on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-021758

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
InvisiRisk, Inc. · finder
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @walknpm/todo-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database