@wagni_bot/web3-toolkitnpm
@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10037) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a web3.js SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
The package installs a postinstall.js payload wired to both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks (and to main), so it runs automatically on npm install. On execution it walks the user's home directory and OS-specific paths and reads files matching wallet, keystore, seed, mnemonic, and credential patterns — including.env, ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, Solana id.json/keypair.json, Ethereum keystores, and browser wallet extension storage for MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), Phantom, and similar extensions. It also scans.txt/.md/.rtf/.csv files across Desktop, Documents, and Downloads (including localized directory names), matches contents against an embedded BIP-39 wordlist to detect seed-phrase backups, and POSTs matching file contents plus host/user identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.homedir()) over plain HTTP to a hardcoded remote endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package.json description is empty and the package ships no legitimate functionality; the web3-themed scoped name is a lure targeting crypto developers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.