@wagni_bot/solana-sdknpm
@wagni_bot/solana-sdk is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10035) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/solana-sdk (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package @wagni_bot/solana-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Solana SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
Package @wagni_bot/solana-sdk impersonates a legitimate Solana SDK but contains no SDK functionality — main points at postinstall.js, which is a credential-harvesting payload that runs automatically on npm install via preinstall/postinstall hooks. On execution the script recursively walks the installer's home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, and /tmp for wallet and secret files (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, MetaMask/Phantom extension storage in Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles,.env, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt), and reads SSH private keys (/.ssh/id_*), AWS credentials (/.aws/credentials), git credentials,.npmrc,.netrc, and Solana/Ethereum keystores. Collected file contents (up to 10KB each) are bundled with os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and cwd, then POSTed in cleartext to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name typosquats the Solana SDK ecosystem to lure developers into installing the harvester.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/solana-sdk (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/solana-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/solana-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/solana-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/solana-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/solana-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.