Which versions of @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk are malicious?

The following npm versions of @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.2.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk if I installed it?

@wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-009043, IN-MAL-2026-009083 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@wagni_bot/jupiter-sdknpm

Malicious code in @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10027

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk

What this malware does

@wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk 1.2.0 impersonates the Jupiter (Solana DEX) SDK namespace but ships no SDK functionality. package.json wires both preinstall and postinstall to postinstall.js, which fires automatically on npm install. postinstall.js walks the installer's home directory and common locations (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, /tmp) collecting: Solana/Ethereum wallet material (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, keystore files, ~/.config/solana/id.json), MetaMask/Phantom browser-extension state from Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles, seed-phrase and mnemonic.txt/.md/.rtf/.csv files identified by keyword lists and BIP39 wordlist matching (>=10 hits), and standard credential paths (.env,.npmrc,.git-credentials,.netrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_* private keys). Collected file contents (up to 5000 bytes per match) plus host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.homedir()) are POSTed to hardcoded C2 at http://107.161.90.180:7777. Package has empty description, no README, and no legitimate code — it is a pure stealer using a typosquat-of-namespace lure against Solana developers.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.01.2.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

39a61b5c33c6e519d3754f8518272984d1bf3bc2045e4f288ad36ac837d0ecf0

bdd44b7f03aec6fe22cce9deeba6f7d00c3ed619a36387f29f5359a19b34e483

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009043IN-MAL-2026-009083

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @wagni_bot/jupiter-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring