@wagni_bot/ethereum-walletnpm
@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10025) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a an Ethereum wallet library SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
@wagni_bot/[email protected] ships a single file postinstall.js that is wired to run automatically via both preinstall and postinstall npm lifecycle hooks (and is also set as package main). On install it recursively walks the user's home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /tmp, and /root looking for cryptocurrency wallet artifacts and credential files, including wallet.json, keystore.json, id.json, metamask.json, phantom.json, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt, private.key,.env files, credentials.json,.npmrc,.netrc,.git-credentials, ~/.ssh private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, and browser extension Local Storage directories for MetaMask and Phantom. It also scans.txt/.md files for BIP-39, seed, mnemonic, and password keywords in English and Spanish. Each matched file's contents (truncated to 10000 bytes) plus hostname, username, and cwd are POSTed to the hardcoded endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package has an empty description and no legitimate functionality beyond this harvester, and its name imitates generic wallet-utility packages to lure developers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.