@wagni_bot/eth-agentnpm
@wagni_bot/eth-agent is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10024) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2, 1.1.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/eth-agent (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package @wagni_bot/eth-agent is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Ethereum SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
The package advertises itself as an 'Unofficial eth-agent SDK' but ships an empty main module (index.js contains only module.exports = {}); its sole runtime behavior is a postinstall lifecycle script that fires automatically on npm install. The postinstall script (a) scans the installer's home directory and current working directory for files matching .pem, .key, id_rsa, id_ed25519, .cred, and .env, (b) walks ~/.ssh to collect SSH private keys, (c) iterates process.env collecting any variable whose name contains PRIVATE, SECRET, TOKEN, API_KEY, PASSWORD, MNEMONIC, SEED, WALLET, or AWS, and (d) POSTs the collected contents along with hostname, username, and cwd to the hardcoded endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777 over plain HTTP with no TLS and no authentication. Errors are silently swallowed. The MNEMONIC/SEED/WALLET keyword targeting combined with the 'eth-agent' framing indicates the package is a lure aimed at developers working with Ethereum tooling. Installing this package causes immediate exfiltration of SSH keys, credential files, and secret-shaped environment variables from the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/eth-agent (9 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/eth-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/eth-agent is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/eth-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/eth-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/eth-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.