@wagni_bot/bsc-sdknpm
@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10023) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a BNB Smart Chain (BSC) SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
@wagni_bot/[email protected] is a typosquat of BSC-SDK-family packages whose sole purpose is credential theft at install time. index.js exports an empty object; the package provides no advertised BNB Smart Chain functionality. The postinstall lifecycle script recursively scans the current working directory, the user's home directory, and ~/.ssh for files matching id_rsa, id_ed25519, *.pem, *.key, *.cred, and.env, and POSTs their contents to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. In parallel, it enumerates process.env for keys containing PRIVATE, SECRET, TOKEN, API_KEY, PASSWORD, MNEMONIC, SEED, WALLET, or AWS and transmits the matching key=value pairs along with hostname, username, and cwd to the same endpoint. The destination is a plaintext HTTP bare IP on a non-standard port, consistent with throwaway stealer infrastructure. Every developer and CI runner that runs npm install on this package has their SSH private keys, PEM certificates, and credential-shaped environment variables shipped to the attacker.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk (8 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@wagni_bot/bsc-sdk is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- codelake Research · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @wagni_bot/bsc-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.