@vitets/vite-tsnpm
Malicious code in @vitets/vite-ts (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as @vitets/vite-ts and copies the legitimate Vite project's author (Evan You), README, homepage (vitejs.dev), and repository (github.com/vitejs/vite) to impersonate the real vite / @vitejs/* packages, and declares a bin entry named vite so consumers who install it and run the vite CLI execute the package's bin/vite.js. After ~5KB of whitespace padding, bin/vite.js contains an obfuscated payload that uses a custom string-scramble routine to hide identifiers (require, child_process, spawn, eval, hostnames, HTTP/JSON-RPC method names) as numeric indices into a reconstructed string table, defeating static IOC scanning. The decoded routine performs an HTTPS GET and a JSON-RPC POST to remote hosts, XORs the response with a key fetched from a second endpoint, runs eval(r) on the result, and additionally child_process.spawns a detached background process to execute it (with detached:true, windowsHide:true). This gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine every time the vite CLI is invoked, with no integrity check on the fetched code. The package's dist/ bundle also contains base64+Buffer decode primitives consistent with additional obfuscated payload handling.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @vitets/vite-ts (version 1.5.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @vitets/vite-ts across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@vitets/vite-ts is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @vitets/vite-ts, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @vitets/vite-ts was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @vitets/vite-ts before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @vitets/vite-ts-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.