@vite-ts/vite-uinpm

Package @vite-ts/[email protected] impersonates the legitimate vite package: it clones vite's README, declares author 'Evan You', homepage https://vitejs.dev, repository vitejs/vite, and a bin entry mapping vite to bin/vite.js. The shipped bin/vite.js contains an obfuscated IIFE that reconstructs a string table from a shuffled blob using the integer seed 4606094 to hide the strings 'https', 'child_process', 'eval', 'POST', '2.0', and the destination URLs. At runtime the payload issues an HTTPS GET to an Ethereum block-explorer URL and a JSON-RPC POST to an Ethereum node, XOR-decodes the hex result to retrieve JavaScript code from an attacker-controlled smart contract (EtherHiding pattern), and executes the retrieved code via eval(r) and via a detached child_process.spawn('node', ['-e',...+r], { detached: true, windowsHide: true }). The fetched bytes are not pinned, not signature-verified, and are mutable by the contract owner, so any consumer invoking the vite CLI from this package runs whatever code the attacker currently has staged on-chain. Additional install-time curl invocations and Buffer.from(...,'base64').toString() decode chains are present in the bundled dist files.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.