@vite-ts/vite-uinpm
Malicious code in @vite-ts/vite-ui (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package @vite-ts/[email protected] impersonates the legitimate vite package: it clones vite's README, declares author 'Evan You', homepage https://vitejs.dev, repository vitejs/vite, and a bin entry mapping vite to bin/vite.js. The shipped bin/vite.js contains an obfuscated IIFE that reconstructs a string table from a shuffled blob using the integer seed 4606094 to hide the strings 'https', 'child_process', 'eval', 'POST', '2.0', and the destination URLs. At runtime the payload issues an HTTPS GET to an Ethereum block-explorer URL and a JSON-RPC POST to an Ethereum node, XOR-decodes the hex result to retrieve JavaScript code from an attacker-controlled smart contract (EtherHiding pattern), and executes the retrieved code via eval(r) and via a detached child_process.spawn('node', ['-e',...+r], { detached: true, windowsHide: true }). The fetched bytes are not pinned, not signature-verified, and are mutable by the contract owner, so any consumer invoking the vite CLI from this package runs whatever code the attacker currently has staged on-chain. Additional install-time curl invocations and Buffer.from(...,'base64').toString() decode chains are present in the bundled dist files.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @vite-ts/vite-ui (version 6.44.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @vite-ts/vite-ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@vite-ts/vite-ui is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @vite-ts/vite-ui, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @vite-ts/vite-ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @vite-ts/vite-ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @vite-ts/vite-ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.