@vite-pro/vite-uinpm

Package @vite-pro/vite-ui impersonates the official vite package: package.json declares author Evan You, points repository at github.com/vitejs/vite, sets homepage to vitejs.dev, ships the upstream Vite README, and exposes a bin named vite. Appended to the end of bin/vite.js, after the legitimate CLI bootstrap and a large block of trailing whitespace, is an obfuscated IIFE that constructs a string table via a seeded Fisher-Yates shuffle (seed 4606094) to hide endpoints, method names, and constants. The loader then fetches a remote payload over HTTP, XOR-decrypts it with an embedded key, and evals the result. It subsequently fetches a second payload and passes it to child_process.spawn with detached:true, stdio:'ignore', and windowsHide:true, establishing a hidden, long-running process independent of the parent vite invocation. The loader runs every time a developer executes vite, npx vite, or npm run dev|build, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution and a persistent background process on the developer machine on each CLI use. The obfuscation technique (seeded string-array shuffle + XOR + eval + detached spawn) matches reported blockchain-C2 loader families.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.