@vite-js/vuinpm
Malicious code in @vite-js/vui (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package publishes under @vite-js/vui while impersonating the official vite package: package.json sets author "Evan You", description "Native-ESM powered web dev build tool", repository github.com/vitejs/vite.git, and bin name "vite" mapped to bin/vite.js. bin/vite.js is the legitimate Vite bootstrapper with an obfuscated trailer appended after the normal start() call: a shuffle-decoder resolves the string "constructor" (var XVL=Oto[Ywu]), builds a Function from a decoded opaque source blob, and immediately invokes it (var CpK=XVL(HuO,Oto(IHO)); var ARH=CpK(Oto('...')); var hTf=plc(byk,ARH); hTf(3504);). Every invocation of the vite command (npm run dev/build/preview, npx vite) executes the hidden author-supplied code on the developer's machine. devDependencies additionally include @solana/web3.js, axios, socket.io-client, and form-data — libraries consistent with wallet-drainer / C2 exfiltration functionality and not present in upstream Vite.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @vite-js/vui (version 7.14.16). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @vite-js/vui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@vite-js/vui is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @vite-js/vui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @vite-js/vui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @vite-js/vui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.