@velkov/isowsnpm
Malicious code in @velkov/isows (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as @velkov/isows while its README, repository (wevm/isows), description ("Isomorphic WebSocket"), and author (jxom.eth) impersonate the legitimate isows package. The legitimate upstream utils.ts is an 8-line getNativeWebSocket helper; in this package, _cjs/utils.js and _esm/utils.js append ~50KB of obfuscator.io-style payload (rotated string array a4(), base64+RC4 decoder a5(), debugger-trap class, while(!![]) loops). The payload runs at top level whenever the package is required or imported (the package.json main is ./_cjs/index.js, which loads ./utils.js). Behavior: re-execs Node with a sentinel env var, dynamically loads https/fs/os/child_process/path/crypto, issues an HTTPS GET to an RC4-decoded host/path, streams the response to a hostname-derived filename under os.tmpdir(), validates a sha256 from a sidecar JSON fetched from the same attacker-controlled host (attacker controls both payload and verification), AES-256-GCM-decrypts the bytes with a key XOR-derived from four embedded 32-byte buffers, chmods 0o755, and spawns the binary {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true} so it survives the parent process. Error-handling stubs are empty to suppress diagnostics. This is the canonical typosquat-plus-dropper supply-chain attack pattern: any installer or transitive consumer that loads @velkov/isows runs attacker-controlled native code on their machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @velkov/isows (version 1.0.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @velkov/isows across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@velkov/isows is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @velkov/isows was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @velkov/isows before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @velkov/isows-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.