@vaultflow/update-flownpm

index.js is a verbatim copy of the feross/buffer module with a single injected top-level statement var ins = import('@vaultflow/create-flow') that dynamically imports a same-scope sibling package on every require. The import result is never used, so the import itself is the effect: any consumer that requires this package silently loads and executes whatever ships in @vaultflow/create-flow's main. Package metadata is a cover story that does not describe the code — package.json name is @vaultflow/update-flow with an empty description, but the README is titled bare-stream with install instructions for an unrelated @sql-access/nods package, and the declared repository points to guilderguzman/sql-link, an unrelated placeholder. The combination of a legitimate-library clone, an injected dynamic import of an undocumented sibling, and mismatched README/repo framing is a supply-chain loader shape that smuggles execution of attacker-controlled sibling-package code into any project that installs this package.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.