@uw010010/vite-treenpm
Malicious code in @uw010010/vite-tree (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package @uw010010/vite-tree impersonates the upstream vite package: its package.json verbatim copies vite's author ('Evan You'), description ('Native-ESM powered web dev build tool'), bin name 'vite', repository (git+https://github.com/vitejs/vite.git), and homepage (https://vitejs.dev), and ships vite's README. Appended to bin/vite.js, after ~5KB of whitespace padding, is an obfuscated trailer that builds a shuffled string-array dispatcher (via Fisher-Yates permutation with String.fromCharCode(127) sentinel substitution) to reconstitute method/property names such as 'http(s)', 'get', 'POST', 'request', 'child_process', 'spawn', 'JSON.parse', 'JSON.stringify', and '2.0'. At runtime the trailer issues an HTTP GET and a JSON-RPC 2.0 POST (id:1) to an attacker-controlled endpoint, XOR-decodes the response with a key derived from the response, and then both eval()s the decoded string and invokes child_process.spawn with detached:true, windowsHide:true, stdio:'ignore' to run the same decoded payload as a detached background process. The bin executes on every invocation of vite / npx vite from this package, so any developer who installs the typosquat and runs the bin gets arbitrary attacker code executed on their machine plus a hidden detached child for persistence.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @uw010010/vite-tree (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @uw010010/vite-tree across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@uw010010/vite-tree is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @uw010010/vite-tree, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @uw010010/vite-tree was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @uw010010/vite-tree before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @uw010010/vite-tree-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.