@uw010010/vite-treenpm
@uw010010/vite-tree is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10470) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @uw010010/vite-tree (npm)
What this malware does
The package @uw010010/vite-tree impersonates the upstream vite package: its package.json verbatim copies vite's author ('Evan You'), description ('Native-ESM powered web dev build tool'), bin name 'vite', repository (git+https://github.com/vitejs/vite.git), and homepage (https://vitejs.dev), and ships vite's README. Appended to bin/vite.js, after ~5KB of whitespace padding, is an obfuscated trailer that builds a shuffled string-array dispatcher (via Fisher-Yates permutation with String.fromCharCode(127) sentinel substitution) to reconstitute method/property names such as 'http(s)', 'get', 'POST', 'request', 'child_process', 'spawn', 'JSON.parse', 'JSON.stringify', and '2.0'. At runtime the trailer issues an HTTP GET and a JSON-RPC 2.0 POST (id:1) to an attacker-controlled endpoint, XOR-decodes the response with a key derived from the response, and then both eval()s the decoded string and invokes child_process.spawn with detached:true, windowsHide:true, stdio:'ignore' to run the same decoded payload as a detached background process. The bin executes on every invocation of vite / npx vite from this package, so any developer who installs the typosquat and runs the bin gets arbitrary attacker code executed on their machine plus a hidden detached child for persistence.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @uw010010/vite-tree (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @uw010010/vite-tree across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@uw010010/vite-tree is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @uw010010/vite-tree, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @uw010010/vite-tree was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @uw010010/vite-tree before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @uw010010/vite-tree-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.