@user-services/web-componentsnpm

@user-services/[email protected] fires a hidden telemetry probe on both the npm install lifecycle (node index.js) and on every require() of the module. The probe in probe/impl.js reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname() and the basename of process.cwd(), concatenates them with a prefix uswc and a timestamp into a subdomain of oob.algamil7x.xyz, and issues a dns.resolve4 query — the query name itself is the exfiltration channel, delivering installer identity to the attacker-controlled authoritative nameserver. The exfil pipeline is deliberately hidden from static analysis: supporting modules (b8d6e3.js, c9e7f4.js) reconstruct the strings os, dns, process, userInfo, hostname, cwd, resolve4 and the destination host oob.algamil7x.xyz from String.fromCharCode byte arrays, and load the os and dns core modules via module.constructor._load(...) instead of a static require. The destination host is not the declared homepage and is not documented anywhere in the package. The scope @user-services and its placeholder repository/author metadata (github.com/user-services/web-components, [email protected]) are generic and consistent with a dependency-confusion lure aimed at organisations with an internal @user-services/* scope.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.