@uisp/utilsnpm
Malicious code in @uisp/utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package published to the public npm registry under the @uisp scope at version 99.0.1 — the canonical dependency-confusion shape (organization-matching scope plus inflated version to outrank private internal releases). package.json declares scripts.preinstall="node beacon.js". beacon.js unconditionally runs child_process.execSync('whoami') and exfiltrates the base64-encoded output to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator host (w963dgom49n3ibi6677fuaxd64cv0loa.oastify.com) via both a DNS lookup of NONCE.<b64>.<collab> and an https.get to https://<collab>/<nonce>/whoami/<b64>. Installer harm: running npm install against the public registry (or any misconfigured registry resolution that falls through to it) auto-executes attacker code on the build host and leaks host identity to an external out-of-band collector. The README's claim of authorized research does not constitute consent for arbitrary installers and does not mitigate the install-time RCE + exfiltration mechanism.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @uisp/utils (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @uisp/utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@uisp/utils is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @uisp/utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @uisp/utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @uisp/utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.