@tvg-mar/promos-gtmnpm

@tvg-mar/[email protected] executes an out-of-band DNS exfiltration routine both at install time (via a scripts.install hook running node index.js) and on require() (top-level module load chain reaching runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js). The probe reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and process.cwd(), concatenates them with a timestamp and a prefix tag, and issues dns.resolve4 against a subdomain of a hardcoded attacker-controlled domain. The destination suffix (oob.algamil7x.xyz), prefix tag (tvggtm), Node built-in names (os, dns, process, userInfo, hostname, cwd, resolve4), and the internal _load API are stored as hex character-code arrays and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode; the os and dns modules are loaded indirectly through module.constructor._load to further hide the behavior. The DNS channel bypasses typical HTTP egress controls and delivers installer host identifiers to attacker infrastructure with no relation to the package's advertised purpose.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.