@ts-internal/shared-libnpm
Malicious code in @ts-internal/shared-lib (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package squats the internal-looking scope @ts-internal/shared-lib on the public npm registry and runs a network beacon both during install (preinstall and postinstall hooks invoke node lifecycle.js) and on module load (index.js calls require('./beacon').beacon('require')). beacon.js collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), os.platform(), and the package name/version, hex-encodes the blob, and transmits it via DNS lookup and HTTPS GET to d8oa6q03t3o2ksbjirogwxiwiyhp6e57o.oast.site (an interactsh OAST collector) and npm-dc-seek-1781572474.testingboxes.com. Any build that misresolves this name to the public registry will silently leak identifying host metadata to two third-party endpoints. The README self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept, but installers cannot consent and cannot verify researcher authorization; the squat-plus-beacon mechanism is the attack regardless of stated intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @ts-internal/shared-lib (version 9.9.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @ts-internal/shared-lib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@ts-internal/shared-lib establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @ts-internal/shared-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @ts-internal/shared-lib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @ts-internal/shared-lib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.