Which versions of @tqm-mfe/main are malicious?

The following npm versions of @tqm-mfe/main are flagged malicious: 5.4.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @tqm-mfe/main if I installed it?

@tqm-mfe/main establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed @tqm-mfe/main — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @tqm-mfe/main was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @tqm-mfe/main part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @tqm-mfe/main is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010360 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @tqm-mfe/main across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @tqm-mfe/main (version 5.4.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @tqm-mfe/main across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@tqm-mfe/mainnpm

Malicious code in @tqm-mfe/main (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10517

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @tqm-mfe/main

What this malware does

scripts/postinstall.js is a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style: 270+ entry rotated string array, RC4+base64 decoders, hex-encoded dispatchers) lifecycle script that runs automatically on npm install. On execution it (1) checks process.argv, process.env.NODE_OPTIONS, and process.execPath against decoded debug/inspector markers plus a wall-clock timing loop to skip the malicious branch under sandboxes and analyzers, then (2) performs an HTTPS fetch of a remote binary payload to a destination assembled at runtime from RC4/base64 fragments, (3) XOR-decrypts the response with a keyed buffer, (4) writes the decrypted files into a per-platform persistent app-data directory (Windows %APPDATA%/%LOCALAPPDATA%, macOS/Linux equivalents) via fs-extra copy/rename, (5) marks them executable, and (6) spawns them detached with stdio:'ignore' and windowsHide:true, unref'd from the installer process to survive after npm exits. In parallel, a beacon posts JSON containing the package name/version, an ISO timestamp, and a system object built from os.homedir(), os.type(), os.platform(), os.hostname(), and os.arch() to a runtime-decoded URL. The package's public metadata (author [email protected], repository github.tqm-mfe.io, homepage docs.tqm-mfe.io, README framing as an internal corporate mirror) does not correspond to a real public project and is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting organizations that might resolve the @tqm-mfe scope from the public registry. All URLs, filenames, keys, and paths are decoded at runtime and none of this behavior is required by the advertised 'API mocking middleware' functionality.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

5.4.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ba70610a96625984d6a26c5cfba828a98fad70a559f34eb881289f9ce4f625a1

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @tqm-mfe/main (version 5.4.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @tqm-mfe/main across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@tqm-mfe/main establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @tqm-mfe/main was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @tqm-mfe/main before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @tqm-mfe/main on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 5.4.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010360

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @tqm-mfe/main-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring