@torbeck/priority-queuenpm
Malicious code in @torbeck/priority-queue (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package republishes @datastructures-js/priority-queue verbatim — identical README pointing to datastructures-js.info, the original author 'Eyas Ranjous', and the upstream repository URL git+https://github.com/datastructures-js/priority-queue.git — under an unrelated @torbeck scope. Its package.json (L33-34) declares "dependencies": { "@datastructures-js/heap": "npm:@torbeck/[email protected]" }, using npm alias syntax to silently substitute the legitimate @datastructures-js/heap with a sibling package @torbeck/[email protected] published by the same untrusted maintainer. src/priorityQueue.js does require('@datastructures-js/heap'), so on every import the substituted @torbeck/heap is loaded in place of the upstream package. The installer-facing harm is the namespace-abuse mechanism itself: any consumer who installs @torbeck/priority-queue automatically pulls @torbeck/heap under a name that reads as the legitimate datastructures-js dependency, regardless of what the @torbeck/heap tarball currently contains. The actual payload, if any, lives in @torbeck/heap and must be analyzed in its own record.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @torbeck/priority-queue (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @torbeck/priority-queue across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @torbeck/priority-queue from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @torbeck/priority-queue was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @torbeck/priority-queue before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @torbeck/priority-queue-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.