@tiledesk/tiledesk-servernpm
Malicious code in @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@tiledesk/tiledesk-server version 2.18.12 is a compromised release of the legitimate Tiledesk customer support platform package. This version was injected with a CI pipeline backdoor as part of the megalodon campaign — a mass GitHub repository backdooring operation targeting CI/CD runner environments.
Attack vector: The malicious payload is embedded in .github/workflows/docker-community-worker-push-latest.yml within the npm tarball, in a step named "Optimize-Build". The step decodes and executes a base64-encoded shell script (set +e; echo "<base64>" | base64 -d | bash).
What it does: The decoded script is a multi-stage CI credential harvester:
- Dumps all environment variables via
printenvand scrapes/proc/self/environand/proc/[0-9]*/environ, capturing secrets from every process on the runner - Exfiltrates credential files:
~/.aws/credentials,~/.ssh/,~/.docker/config.json,~/.npmrc,~/.kube/config,~/.vault-token,.git-credentials, GCP Application Default Credentials, and Terraform credentials - Enumerates AWS profiles to extract access keys, secret keys, and session tokens; runs
gcloud auth print-access-tokenfor GCP - Queries cloud IMDS endpoints (
169.254.169.254,metadata.google.internal) for instance credentials - Steals
ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKENto mint arbitrary OIDC tokens for cloud impersonation - Scans
/var/www,/opt,/srvfor certificate files (.pem,.key,.p12,.pfx) and runs regex-based secret scanning for 30+ patterns including AWS AKIA keys, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, PyPI tokens, private keys, and database connection strings
C2 infrastructure: All stolen data is exfiltrated via HTTP POST to http://216.126.225.129:8443 with query parameters ?h=megalodon&l=gh_dump&id=hefs8esnhgkx.
Trigger: Execution occurs during GitHub Actions Docker build workflows. Any CI pipeline that included this package version in a Docker build would have had its entire runner secrets environment exfiltrated at build time.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @tiledesk/tiledesk-server across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@tiledesk/tiledesk-server is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @tiledesk/tiledesk-server was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @tiledesk/tiledesk-server before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @tiledesk/tiledesk-server-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.