@thone33/core-utilsnpm
Malicious code in @thone33/core-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@thone33/core-utils 1.0.4 is a loader stub. Its main entry (index.js) imports activate from the same-author dependency @thone33/analytics-injector and invokes it at module top level whenever process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'. The author's own inline comment describes this as silently activating a payload in production ('ATIVA O PAYLOAD SILENCIOSAMENTE (em produção)'). The package is advertised as 'Core utilities', which does not justify production-gated invocation of an 'analytics-injector' dependency. The NODE_ENV=production gate is a developer-laptop-dormant / production-fires evasion pattern: consumers' local dev and CI environments see nothing, while deployed production processes execute whatever code the author publishes under @thone33/analytics-injector. Because the injector is in the same author scope and pinned as ^1.0.0, the author can ship arbitrary additional code into consumers' production runtimes via a minor/patch release without any change to this package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @thone33/core-utils (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @thone33/core-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @thone33/core-utils from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @thone33/core-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @thone33/core-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @thone33/core-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.