@tanstack/start-storage-contextnpm
Malicious code in @tanstack/start-storage-context (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This version of @tanstack/start-storage-context belongs to the @tanstack/* package family that was compromised via CI cache poisoning, with 42 packages republished in two malicious versions each on 2026-05-11. The campaign's structural fingerprints include: an undeclared multi-megabyte obfuscated JavaScript blob at the tarball root not listed in package.json's "files" array; an optionalDependencies entry pointing at a github: orphan-commit reference ("@tanstack/setup": "github:tanstack/router#<sha>") to smuggle a second-stage payload outside the npm registry; harvesting of cloud-provider metadata (AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, Kubernetes SA tokens), npm tokens from ~/.npmrc, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys; exfiltration over Session/Oxen (filev2.getsession.org, seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org) to defeat IP/domain blocking; second-stage fetch from litter.catbox.moe (anonymous 72-hour-TTL host); /proc/<pid>/mem scraping of the GitHub Actions runner's OIDC token to publish further malicious versions; and self-propagation via the npm maintainer-search API. Installing this version on a developer machine or CI runner exposes credentials, cloud metadata, and any reachable npm/GitHub publishing identities to the attacker.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
This package was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.
The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @tanstack/start-storage-context (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @tanstack/start-storage-context across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@tanstack/start-storage-context is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @tanstack/start-storage-context was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @tanstack/start-storage-context before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @tanstack/start-storage-context-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.