@sudoughnym/enviro-demonpm
Malicious code in @sudoughnym/enviro-demo (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@sudoughnym/[email protected] ships preinstall.js and postinstall.js lifecycle scripts that run automatically on npm install. Both scripts collect host identifiers and environment metadata — os.hostname(), process.cwd(), pid, node version, platform, process.env.USER, the first ten environment variable names, and the total env count — and POST them as JSON to https://webhook.site/f83b073c-a04a-4ac5-8930-507051bd22f7, a third-party webhook capture service not associated with the package's stated publisher. The package version (99.99.99) and its own description identify it as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept targeting an internal enviro package name; the inflated semver is intended to outrank private-registry versions so internal build systems resolve to this public package. Installer harm: any build or developer machine that resolves to this version leaks host identity and environment-variable layout (which can include secret-bearing variable names) to an attacker-controlled endpoint on every install.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sudoughnym/enviro-demo (version 99.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sudoughnym/enviro-demo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@sudoughnym/enviro-demo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @sudoughnym/enviro-demo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sudoughnym/enviro-demo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sudoughnym/enviro-demo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.