@sudobility/testomniac_clientnpm
Advisory published Updated
@sudobility/testomniac_client is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18129) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.0.131). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @sudobility/testomniac_client (npm)
What this malware does
The package declares a postinstall hook that executes scripts/miner.sh on every npm install. The script downloads a gzip payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using an embedded AWS access key <redacted> and a signed URL), writes it to /tmp/.smh / /tmp/.smi, and either executes it as a persistent agent via passwordless sudo or extracts a bundled bin/miner-linux-amd64 binary and launches it under a randomized system-component-like process name using nohup. The agent branch is described in the script as installing stealth-renamed persistence with cron and a relay/tor channel, and the miner is configured to connect to the XMRig pool at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with a hardcoded Monero wallet. The package's advertised purpose is a TanStack Query client, which is unrelated to any of this behavior. All of the above executes automatically as root (when passwordless sudo is available) or as the installing user on a default npm install.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for @sudobility/testomniac_client (version 0.0.131).
If you installed it — respond
@sudobility/testomniac_client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @sudobility/testomniac_client was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sudobility/testomniac_client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.