@subql/commonnpm

package.json declares a postinstall hook node./dist/project/readers/manifest-cache.js. That file embeds ~60KB of base64 chunks under MANIFEST_CACHE_SEED and a custom decodeManifestSeed routine that XOR-unmasks the bytes with 0x5a and zlib.gunzipSyncs the result. When the file runs as main (require.main === module), the decoded string is passed to new Function(decodeManifestSeed())(__filename, [...]), yielding arbitrary code execution on every npm install with no signature, no network pin, and no human-readable payload. The shipped source map's sourcesContent for manifest-cache.js ends at a benign ManifestCacheReader class and does not contain the top-level require.main === module dispatcher that appears in the compiled JS, indicating the source map was scrubbed to hide the loader from source-level review. The dropper is also reachable at runtime through the package's public API: dist/index.js re-exports ./project, which re-exports ./manifest-cache, and ManifestCacheReader.warm() spawns a detached node __filename --warm subprocess that re-enters the main-mode decode-and-eval branch outside the parent process lifecycle.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.