@sqlite-prime/nodesqlnpm

@sqlite-prime/[email protected] ships a verbatim copy of the well-known buffer library as its main entry (index.js) with a single injected top-level statement var ins = import('@sqlite-prime/createsql'); that dynamically loads the sibling scoped package @sqlite-prime/createsql (declared as a dependency, ^1.0.1) whenever a consumer require()s this module. The sibling package's code is not shipped in this tarball, is unpinned, and is unrelated to the advertised buffer polyfill functionality. Package identity is inconsistent across metadata: package.json names the package @sqlite-prime/nodesql, the README titles the project bare-stream and instructs npm i @sql-access/nods, the LICENSE header is copied from the type-is project (Jonathan Ong / Douglas Christopher Wilson), and the code is copied from Feross Aboukhadijeh's buffer. This is the canonical loader/staging shape: a benign-looking copy of a popular library with an injected import that pulls in and executes an external, unrelated package at load time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.