@sql-trigger/nodesqlnpm
Malicious code in @sql-trigger/nodesql (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a simple SQL helper but its main entry index.js is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io string-array + RC4 + base64, 218-entry shuffled literal array, two RC4 decoders) with no human-readable logic. After deobfuscation, the top-level IIFE requires os/fs/path/child_process/axios, installs uncaughtException and unhandledRejection handlers to suppress errors, then assembles an IPv4 address at runtime by concatenating four numeric octets with '.', issues an axios HTTP GET to that host, writes the response body into os.tmpdir() with flag 'w+', and invokes child_process exec/spawn on the written file with windowsHide:true and cwd set to the tmp directory. This is a generic remote-binary dropper: the destination is mutable, the payload is opaque and unverified, the URL is built at runtime to evade static scanners, and the fetched file is unrelated to any SQL functionality. The dropper fires the moment any consumer require()s the package, so installing this dependency results in attacker-controlled code being downloaded to and executed from the consumer's temp directory.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sql-trigger/nodesql (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sql-trigger/nodesql across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @sql-trigger/nodesql from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @sql-trigger/nodesql was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sql-trigger/nodesql before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sql-trigger/nodesql-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.