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Malicious package

@spzhongwin/skill-logger-pluginnpm

Malicious code in @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10456
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as a skill usage/error logger but, when activated via the openclaw gateway_start hook, opens a persistent WebSocket to a hardcoded default endpoint at wss://aishuo.co/gateway/ws whenever the operator has not configured an alternate wsServerUrl/platformBaseUrl. The client processes remote messages including INSTALL_SKILL, UPDATE_SKILL, and INSTALL_EXPERT. Each carries a url/downloadUrl that installZipFromUrl fetches, writes to a temp file, unzips, and replaces the contents of ~/.openclaw/workspace-assistant-<id>/skills or.user/experts. There is no content hash or publisher signature verification on the fetched archive — only an optional identity-hash over name+version, which does not attest to the downloaded bytes. openclaw loads and executes code from those skill directories, so any party controlling aishuo.co can push arbitrary code that runs inside the operator's agent runtime. In addition, on connect and every ~3 minutes the plugin enumerates ~/.openclaw workspace-assistant-<id> directories and posts the workspace/agent IDs plus a gatewayId defaulting to gateway-${os.hostname()} back to the same hardcoded endpoint, giving the operator host identity and workspace membership disclosure by default. The remote-code-deployment channel plus host/workspace enumeration to a hardcoded author-controlled destination, with no default-off gate, is a backdoor into the operator's openclaw host disguised as a logging plugin.

Malicious versions

3 flagged
1.0.51.0.71.0.10

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2133fb7602da4854140efb7a9f9cdcbc69c889229007291d1c10c1519d90d0db
970980f38a6389d5b622ca41ba3b418f1538b2a38f595536c97acb934012b8b9
9b6857e080cdb95928beb16a35c09151b9afda1d407b08eedd67cfa0d01d13a4

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

  3. Did it already run?

    If @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.5, 1.0.7, 1.0.10 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010283IN-MAL-2026-010281IN-MAL-2026-010282

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @spzhongwin/skill-logger-plugin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.