@sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-trackernpm
Malicious code in @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a dependency ltidisafe whose version specifier is the raw URL https://storage.googleapis.com/lscunpentest/pack_ux_foundry.tgz — a tarball hosted on a generic Google Cloud Storage bucket unrelated to the package's nominal publisher (@sourceflow-uk). On npm install, npm fetches and installs that tarball as a transitive dependency, executing any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) it contains on the installer's machine. The URL is not version-pinned, not hash-verified, and not under the publisher's control: the bucket owner can swap the tarball contents at any time, so a future install delivers different bytes than a present install with no package change. The wrapper package itself is hollow — index.js only runs console.log("hello from lslslslslss"), the description is the garbled string lspodcc, the author is lslsls, and the version is 99.91.9. These attributes are inconsistent with the advertised "sourceflow tracker" functionality and consistent with a throwaway lure whose sole purpose is to chain-load the third-party tarball into the installer's dependency tree.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker (version 99.91.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @sourceflow-uk/sourceflow-tracker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.