@solana-labs/web3jsnpm
Malicious code in @solana-labs/web3js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package impersonates the legitimate @solana/web3.js library under a confusable scope (@solana-labs/web3js). On npm install, the postinstall hook executes install.js, which loads os, child_process, fs, and https, collects host identifiers via os.hostname() and os.userInfo() along with process.platform, probes filesystem paths via fs.existsSync(...), and issues HTTPS POST requests carrying the harvested information. install.js also invokes execSync('powershell...') and execSync('curl...') to run shell commands fetched/triggered at install time. A reference to http://www.apple.com appears alongside the exfiltration code, consistent with connectivity-check or decoy behavior. The combination of name-squat against a widely used Solana library, automatic execution at install via postinstall, host enumeration, and shell execution constitutes an installer-targeted supply-chain attack.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/web3js (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/web3js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/web3js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/web3js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.