@solana-labs/web3jsnpm
@solana-labs/web3js is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5788) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @solana-labs/web3js (npm)
What this malware does
Package name @solana-labs/web3js closely resembles the well-known @solana/web3.js library (different scope, missing dot in module name). The bundled lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js are large minified blobs that include require('child_process'), fetch(, POST, curl, and ping strings, but the bundle is consistent in shape with a Solana web3 client SDK (RPC client, websocket subscriptions, JSON-RPC POST calls to user-configured endpoints). The keyword co-occurrence in a minified rollup bundle does not by itself confirm exfiltration: a JSON-RPC client legitimately POSTs to caller-supplied RPC URLs, and child_process references can come from bundled diagnostics or test utilities pulled into the rollup. No lifecycle script, top-level network beacon, or hardcoded attacker endpoint has been confirmed in the traced code. The primary concern is name/scope confusion against the official @solana/web3.js package, which carries real installer risk if developers select the wrong dependency. Routing to human review to (a) confirm whether the scope @solana-labs is an official Solana publisher or a lookalike, and (b) de-minify the relevant spans of the bundle to confirm the network calls are caller-configured RPC endpoints rather than a hardcoded C2.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/web3js (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/web3js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/web3js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/web3js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.