@solana-labs/web3-jsnpm
Malicious code in @solana-labs/web3-js (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name @solana-labs/web3-js impersonates the legitimate @solana/web3.js and index.js simply re-exports the real package as cover. The postinstall hook in package.json runs node install.js, which executes a full attack chain on every install: (1) XOR-decodes a hardcoded Telegram bot token and chat id; (2) collect() reads installer secrets from ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/solana/id.json, ~/.solana/id.json, project and system .env files (/root/.env, /home/node/.env, /app/.env), and scrapes process.env for variables matching /KEY|SECRET|MNEMONIC|PRIVATE|TOKEN|AWS|NPM|GITHUB/i; (3) exfilNow() POSTs the harvested secrets in chunks to api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage; (4) writes /tmp/.cron-tmp and pipes it through crontab - to install an @reboot sleep 90 && node install.js persistence entry; (5) enters an infinite c2Loop() polling Telegram getUpdates and dispatching attacker-supplied /sh, /cmd, /keys, /ssh, /env, /wallet commands through execSync, giving the operator arbitrary remote code execution. An HMAC AUTH_SECRET and the bot credentials are XOR-obfuscated, with an in-source comment acknowledging anti-scanner intent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@solana-labs/web3-js' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/web3-js (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/web3-js across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/web3-js is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/web3-js was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3-js before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/web3-js-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.