@solana-labs/spl-tokenpm
@solana-labs/spl-toke is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5787) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @solana-labs/spl-toke (npm)
What this malware does
Package name @solana-labs/spl-toke is a likely confusion-attack against the well-known @solana/spl-token SPL token client (missing trailing n, different scope). The shipped lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js bundles contain the keyword combinations fetch( / POST / https.get / ping that pattern-matched as potential C2 / exfiltration shapes, but tracing of the minified bundle did not complete and the literal destination URLs and trigger paths could not be confirmed in this run. The ping token may be benign (e.g. a websocket keepalive method or solana RPC ping helper) and the fetch calls may be ordinary RPC traffic — but neither has been verified, and combined with the typosquat-shaped name on a high-value scope (@solana-labs/* mimicking the official solana-labs GitHub org and the canonical @solana/spl-token package), this needs human review before installer use.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/spl-toke (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/spl-toke across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/spl-toke is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/spl-toke was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/spl-toke before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/spl-toke-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.