@solana-labs/etherjsnpm
Malicious code in @solana-labs/etherjs (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as @solana-labs/etherjs but its README documents itself as @solana-labs/web3.js and instructs consumers to import { Connection, PublicKey, Keypair } from '@solana-labs/web3.js' — the legitimate Solana SDK is @solana/web3.js (no -labs). Developers who copy the README install line land on this package instead. The Node CommonJS and ESM bundles (lib/index.cjs.js, lib/index.esm.js) are a fork of solana-web3.js with an injected payload that, on require()/import, reads process.env (lines 11365-11366, 11448, 11453, 11542, 11547 in the CJS bundle) and POSTs the harvested data to a hardcoded bare IP http://104.239.66.223:8899 (line 11384) and to https://api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage with a fixed chat_id (lines 11415-11417). The same blocks repeatedly require('child_process') (lines 11441, 11466, 11479, 11495, 11535) and invoke curl, enabling attacker-influenced shell execution on the installer host. The browser/native bundles omit the payload, confirming it is gated to Node consumers. Both attacker destinations are hardcoded with no opt-out.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@solana-labs/etherjs' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/etherjs (8 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/etherjs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/etherjs is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/etherjs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/etherjs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/etherjs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.