@solana-labs/ancornpm
Malicious code in @solana-labs/ancor (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name @solana-labs/ancor is a one-character typosquat of the legitimate @coral-xyz/anchor / @project-serum/anchor Solana framework, published under the @solana-labs scope to impersonate official Solana Labs tooling. package.json declares "postinstall": "node install.js", which fires automatically on npm install. install.js reads host identifiers via os.hostname() and process.platform, invokes child_process.execSync, issues outbound HTTP/HTTPS traffic (including a POST at line 113 and a curl shell-out at line 173), and references https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com as cover traffic. The combination of (a) impersonating-scope name targeting a top-tier ecosystem package, (b) a postinstall lifecycle hook executing a script that reads host identity and shells out to network primitives, and (c) execSync of arbitrary commands during install constitutes an install-time host reconnaissance / command-execution payload against any developer or build system that installs this package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/ancor (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/ancor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/ancor is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @solana-labs/ancor, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/ancor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/ancor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/ancor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.