@solana-labs/ancornpm
@solana-labs/ancor is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5786) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @solana-labs/ancor (npm)
What this malware does
Package is published as @solana-labs/ancor — a name one character off from anchor, the well-known Solana smart-contract framework (published as @coral-xyz/anchor, formerly @project-serum/anchor). The @solana-labs scope and the near-miss spelling ancor together create high confusion potential for developers searching for the Anchor framework. The shipped bundles lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js are large minified rollups (~11k+ lines) that include require('child_process'), fetch(...) POST calls, and references to curl / ping. Pattern matches on keyword co-occurrence in a minified bundle do not by themselves prove malicious intent — Anchor and similar frameworks legitimately bundle child_process and HTTP for build/CLI tooling — but the combination of a typosquat-shaped name, a vendor-impersonating scope, and a large opaque bundle warrants human review before this version is allowed into installer environments. A reviewer should verify scope ownership (is @solana-labs actually controlled by Solana Labs, or a squatted scope?), de-minify the flagged regions around lines 5016/5046 and 11336/11441 to confirm whether the POST/fetch destinations and child_process spawns are part of a documented build/CLI flow or an exfiltration path, and compare bundle behavior against legitimate @coral-xyz/anchor.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-labs/ancor (18 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-labs/ancor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-labs/ancor is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @solana-labs/ancor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-labs/ancor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-labs/ancor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.