@solana-js/web3npm
@solana-js/web3 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13941) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 1.91.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in @solana-js/web3 (npm)
What this malware does
Package name @solana-js/web3 impersonates the legitimate @solana/web3.js SDK, and package.json falsely attributes authorship to 'Solana Labs' with a solana.com homepage. The exported API is a non-functional stub (Connection.getBalance returns 0, sendTransaction returns random bytes) — no real Solana client functionality is present. On install, scripts/postinstall.js detects Windows and spawns a hidden PowerShell (-NoP -W Hidden -Exec Bypass) with a base64-encoded command. The decoded PowerShell performs an AMSI bypass via reflection over System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils, downloads a binary payload from https://files.catbox.moe/a3loxy.bin, and executes it in-process using VirtualAlloc/CreateThread. The postinstall script further hex-escapes API names ('child_process', 'powershell', 'platform', 'win32') and fragments the PowerShell payload to hinder review. The result is arbitrary remote code execution on any Windows host that runs npm install against this package, with the shellcode fetched from an anonymous, mutable file host (files.catbox.moe) — a known-bad-infrastructure dropper pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @solana-js/web3 (version 1.91.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @solana-js/web3 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@solana-js/web3 is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove @solana-js/web3, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If @solana-js/web3 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @solana-js/web3 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @solana-js/web3-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.