Which versions of @sheltr_/agent are malicious?

The following npm versions of @sheltr_/agent are flagged malicious: 1.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @sheltr_/agent if I installed it?

@sheltr_/agent is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @sheltr_/agent — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @sheltr_/agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @sheltr_/agent part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @sheltr_/agent is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010286 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @sheltr_/agent across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sheltr_/agent (version 1.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sheltr_/agent across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@sheltr_/agentnpm

Malicious code in @sheltr_/agent (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10469

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @sheltr_/agent

What this malware does

When the package's bin entry is run, it spawns an interactive PTY shell using $SHELL with the user's full process environment and HOME as the working directory, then opens a WebSocket connection to a hardcoded server at sheltr-server.up.railway.app. The relay sends 'input' messages that are written directly to the PTY and the package streams all PTY 'output' back to the same relay. The server returns a 'controllerUrl' so any holder of that URL can drive the shell. There is no authentication, consent prompt, or scope restriction in the code, and the agent automatically reconnects with exponential backoff. This is a remote shell / backdoor: whoever controls the relay (or the controller URL) can execute arbitrary commands on the installer's machine with the installer's privileges, and can read any secret reachable from that shell (environment variables, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, arbitrary files) by issuing commands and reading the streamed output.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0ecc4dcd6d76f100601f8b37a6b9c3aab899770ab361f2714f9193a2f8d0db78

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @sheltr_/agent (version 1.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @sheltr_/agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@sheltr_/agent is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @sheltr_/agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @sheltr_/agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @sheltr_/agent on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010286

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @sheltr_/agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring