@servicetitan/widget-platformnpm

npm/@servicetitan/widget-platform is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares "preinstall": "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (v1.3.13) into a temp directory, unzips it, chmods the binary executable, and invokes it with a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync. math_init.js is a ~727 KB single-line obfuscator.io-style payload (indexed constants array, WV8StW string-array rotator, _0xNNNN renamed identifiers) that is not referenced by the library's dist/index.js entrypoint and has no relationship to the package's stated purpose (a React widget platform with peer deps on react, @servicetitan/react-ioc, @servicetitan/web-components). The obfuscated payload is executed under an alternate runtime specifically so that Node-based tooling does not observe its behavior, and this fires unconditionally during npm install. This matches the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: the runtime is fetched from its official domain, but it is then used to execute a bundled, opaque payload whose contents cannot be inspected and which serves no purpose relating to the advertised library. The scope @servicetitan/* and version 5.6.1 are consistent with the impersonation pattern of the mini-shai-hulud family targeting vendor scopes; regardless of attribution, the mechanism itself is install-time execution of an obfuscated payload on every installer's machine.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.