@servicetitan/web-componentsnpm

npm/@servicetitan/web-components is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

This version's package.json declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that downloads the Bun runtime for the installer's platform and architecture from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases (v1.3.13), extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and uses it via execFileSync to run a sibling file math_init.js shipped inside the tarball. math_init.js is a 727 KB heavily obfuscated @bun @bun-cjs bundle with hex-named identifiers, a large mixed numeric/string constants array, and a rotating-array string decoder (WV8StW shifts entries of a global constants array), and its filename does not correspond to any advertised functionality of a microfrontends/web-components library. The preinstall loader setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with _0x488df8-style identifiers and per-function property-name maps that hide strings like ldd, --version, /etc/os-release, Alpine, and musl used to distinguish musl vs glibc Linux and to select the correct Bun archive and extraction method (native unzip, PowerShell Expand-Archive, or an in-process ZIP parser). The alternate-runtime-dropper shape (fetch a second language runtime at install time solely to execute a shipped obfuscated payload under it, bypassing Node-based scanning) combined with obfuscation of both the loader and the payload, and the mismatch between the payload filename math_init.js and the package's stated purpose, is inconsistent with a legitimate release of @servicetitan/web-components and consistent with a compromised or hijacked publish.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.