@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-ui-cypressnpm

npm/@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-ui-cypress is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs. setup.mjs (with obfuscated identifiers such as _0x488df8) probes for a local bun binary and, if absent, downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB heavily obfuscated Bun-CJS bundle (rotated string/number array via a WV8StW shift routine, single-letter mangled identifiers, character-decoder table, no readable URLs or function names) whose behavior cannot be determined from source. Executing an opaque bundled payload under a freshly downloaded alternate language runtime at npm install time gives arbitrary code execution on the installer's host under the identity of the install process. The package is published under the @servicetitan scope and advertises itself as "Cypress helpers for Titan Chat and Titan Chatbot UI packages," a stated purpose that has no need for a second language runtime, GitHub-hosted binary downloads, or an obfuscated 700KB blob; the combination is consistent with scope impersonation of a trusted organization.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.