@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-uinpm

npm/@servicetitan/titan-chatbot-ui is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex-suffix identifiers such as _0x488df8/_0x52943e/_0x548d91, per-function proxy maps like {YCZJE, QkQej, JBhWy} mapping opaque keys to string constants and wrapped calls) and, on install, downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/..., extracts it to a temporary directory, chmod 0o755s it, and invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js']). If a local bun binary already exists, the same sibling math_init.js is executed directly. math_init.js is a 727,680-byte single-line @bun @bun-cjs module with a large mixed numeric/string constant array, an array-rotation decoder (WV8StW), and a string-array lookup routine (hc1jfK9) — a javascript-obfuscator string-array + control-flow-indirection layout. The package is advertised as a React chatbot UI component library; rendering React components does not require pulling in an alternate language runtime at install time or executing an obfuscated 727KB blob. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern deliberately routes payload execution through Bun so that standard Node.js-oriented review of the package does not evaluate what actually runs on installer machines.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.