@servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-commonnpm

npm/@servicetitan/titan-chat-ui-common is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (v1.3.13), extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and then invokes it against a bundled sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727KB file with obfuscator.io fingerprints — string-array rotation (a helper performing .push(.shift()) on a mixed-type constant table) and a per-string decoder built from a shuffled alphabet — with no plausible relation to the package's advertised chat-UI purpose. The setup script itself uses obfuscated identifiers (_0x488df8, etc.) to hide the dropper flow. Running the payload under Bun rather than Node bypasses Node-based supply-chain scanners, and the entire chain fires automatically on npm install before consumers can inspect the code. The package is published under the @servicetitan scope and its dist/ tree references servicetitan/titan-chatbot-client PRs, while the preinstall dropper and math_init.js appear grafted onto that otherwise-legitimate UI code — consistent with a scope-hijack or dependency-confusion upload rather than a first-party release.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.