@servicetitan/time-zonesnpm

npm/@servicetitan/time-zones is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package is published as a React/MobX time-zone UI component library but its package.json declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style _0xXXXX identifiers and per-call string-map decoy objects) and, at npm install time, downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip, extracts it, chmods it 0o755, and calls execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, "math_init.js")], { stdio: "inherit" }). If Bun is already on PATH the download step is skipped and the same file is executed directly. math_init.js is a 727 KB Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs) whose contents are hidden behind a shuffled string-array cipher (WV8StW rotator over the n7gIxM array), a form that resists Node-based static and dynamic analysis. package.json declares "files": ["dist", "src"], yet math_init.js and setup.mjs sit at the tarball root outside both directories, indicating the payload was injected outside the maintainer's normal publish flow. A UI time-zone library has no legitimate reason to fetch an alternate JavaScript runtime at install time and use it to run an opaque bundled payload; the runtime substitution routes execution around Node-based supply-chain scanners. The precise post-execution behavior of math_init.js is not readable from the shipped form, but installing this version causes attacker-authored code to run under Bun on the installer's machine at npm install time.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.