@servicetitan/thoughtspot-themenpm

npm/@servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

Package @servicetitan/[email protected] declares itself as a ThoughtSpot theme-wiring helper but ships an install-time dropper that runs under a freshly-downloaded alternate JavaScript runtime, bypassing Node-based scanning. package.json sets scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs uses obfuscated _0xXXXX string-lookup identifiers; it attempts to locate a local bun binary and otherwise downloads the Bun runtime ZIP from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/..., extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it to 0755, and invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js'], { cwd: D }). The executed math_init.js is a 727KB single-line, string-array-shuffle obfuscated bundle (rotating WV8StW shifter over a large n7gIxM dictionary with hex/base decoder hc1jfK9) whose contents are opaque and unrelated to CSS/theme wiring. package.json files declares only dist, yet both setup.mjs and math_init.js ship at tarball root and execute during npm install; the dist/index.js theme code is not reached by the preinstall path. The alternate-runtime dropper shape — install-time fetch of a different language runtime specifically to execute a shipped obfuscated payload the Node scanners cannot read — is the fingerprint of a loader/stealer under a scope-impersonation cover story.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.