Which versions of @servicetitan/startup are malicious?

The following npm versions of @servicetitan/startup are flagged malicious: 38.1.1, 38.1.2, 38.1.3, 38.1.4, 38.1.5, 38.1.6, 38.1.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate @servicetitan/startup if I installed it?

@servicetitan/startup is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed @servicetitan/startup — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If @servicetitan/startup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is @servicetitan/startup part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — @servicetitan/startup is associated with the GHSA-hf4g-5fqx-f33r, IN-MAL-2026-011462 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find @servicetitan/startup across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @servicetitan/startup (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @servicetitan/startup across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

@servicetitan/startupnpm

@servicetitan/startup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11923) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 38.1.1, 38.1.2, 38.1.3…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in @servicetitan/startup (npm)

MAL-2026-11923

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall @servicetitan/startup

What this malware does

npm/@servicetitan/startup is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases (v1.3.13), writes it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a 727KB sibling file math_init.js shipped at the tarball root. math_init.js is heavily obfuscated (hex-numbered string-array cipher with an array-rotation decoder, single-letter identifiers, opaque numeric literal array of ~727KB) and its logic is not statically analyzable. The two files (setup.mjs and math_init.js) sit at the tarball root but are not listed in package.json files (bin, dist, eslint, jest, patches, src, tsconfig), indicating they were injected outside the declared manifest. Running npm install @servicetitan/[email protected] fetches Bun and executes attacker-supplied obfuscated code on the installer host under a non-Node runtime, bypassing Node-based install-time inspection.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

7 flagged

38.1.138.1.238.1.338.1.438.1.538.1.638.1.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ca74b5aaefb9796cd90e6f89009a918bf78c8a9d83a24d11a6008308914cff51

a7a4e1f77cc7c197abed1d644e38ecd5ed29f87e727ba962c076c4069dd0e328

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for @servicetitan/startup (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging @servicetitan/startup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
@servicetitan/startup is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If @servicetitan/startup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks @servicetitan/startup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. @servicetitan/startup on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 38.1.1, 38.1.2, 38.1.3, 38.1.4, 38.1.5, 38.1.6, 38.1.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-hf4g-5fqx-f33rIN-MAL-2026-011462

References

Credits

Aikido Security · finder
Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder
Socket Threat Research Team · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks @servicetitan/startup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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